There are names that are repeated and linked. And in more than one team. “First cousin” clubs that they trade players to each other. They belong to companies and investment funds located in tax havens. And in the name of lawyers, hide its real shareholders. The Chilean Senate has begun efforts to provide more transparency to business. Imposing restrictions on timeshare ownership and player agents serving on club boards, for example. The scandal erupted in recent weeks as the Financial Market Commission (CMF) ordered the intervention and liquidation of Sartor Group, owner of the famous Universidad de Chile. More than ninety percent of the clubs in the three main categories of Chilean soccer have the SAD scheme. A crisis model.
In addition to the University of Chile, documents cited by the Chilean portal CIPER (Center for Journalistic Research) specifically mention Huachipato and also to Ñublense. There is a list of business leaders who lead Michael Clark, president of Azul Azul (concessionaire of the University of Chile) and Victoriano Cerda, and also included Hernán Rosenblum, Patricio Kiblisky, Jacques Gliksberg. Partners or front men. Companies called Sportscap Credit Fund LLC, Nexus, Redwood Capital, Isapre Masvida, Inverdep, RVX. Credits that take TV rights as a pledge.
Leaders whose source of money is uncertain. Hidden shareholders. However, the dates on which the credit must be repaid seem more clear. And in dollars, of course. The CMF auditor noticed a serious conflict of interest in the financing of the credits and put the brakes on the Sartor group. It’s a blow to a model that’s supposed to improve soccer in Chile, but that’s it he focused a lot on easy business and neglected the future.
Two SAD clubs were relegated this year in Peru. César Vallejo University and Unión Comerciothe first one controlled by a major politician in Peru (César Acuña) who hired Paolo Guerrero, until the veteran scorer got tired of losing in semi-deserted stadiums and left Alianza. And the second, under the control of Freddy Chaves, who moved the club from the jungle to a city with a closer airport and who, with the relegation already confirmed, fired a good part of the squad to lower on salary, others were suspended, they were accused. on “sold and drunk” and played a penultimate date with mostly 16 and 17 year olds beaten on their own field 12-0 in Sporting Cristal.
In Spain, where the economic weakness of the giant Barcelona is hot, a SAD Club is being debated these days Cádizthe team where the Salvadoran star plays Jorge “Magico” Gonzálezand that fell to the last places of the second division. Its president-sports director (Manuel Vizcaíno), the one accused in the chronicles, earns close to one million euros per year, more than the coach and any player. The records also relate to the two shareholders who in the four years made a profit between them 7.3 million eurosobscene money in the category.
And a judicial accusation of emptying, among the liquidated companies, inflated the purchase of land for a project (Sport Tech) which is a barrel without funds. And without a clear distinction between Cádiz CF and Cádiz Sport City SL, the first may have lent the names of businesses to the second, all favored by a controversial report from an international consulting company, according to which, Cádiz is only worth 15 million euros, a quarter of its real value. Botafogo SAD champion of the Libertadores it seems like a big temptation. However, these other stories about the mismanagement of SAD Clubs anywhere in the world are silent. Almost hidden. Like the famous fine print in contracts.
The bulldozer government of Javier Milei did something in the State on the issue of SAD Clubs, so there is already a judicial complaint against the libertarian representative Juliana Santillan. In his world of good and evil, Milei makes the SAD football project he leads uncomfortable Juan Sebastian Veron on Students in La Plata. Verón’s history as a player and a decade at the helm of the club mark the commitment and credibility for most of the partners. And also his ambition to bring Estudiantes to the top.
But it’s not the same as partner (American Foster Gillett). His most visible background, his time as a leader with his father in Liverpool, England, requires more caution. Who knows if he will be the best partner to give the club football rights for 30, 60 or even 100 years. When good deals are finally shared, as it seems, eighty for the investor, twenty for the club.
What would be the distribution if there was a gem in the lower ranks (formed by the club, not bought by Gillett). Who will have the majority to decide the new society that will control Estudiantes football? Who bears the costs if the adventure goes wrong? Will Gillett be free to sell his rights to any investor he wants? The students have disappeared three consecutive Libertadores champions (1968-70) which is lower than today. And then he became the champion of the Cup and of Argentina again, again as Civil Association. He is good as a master himself. Your partners will ultimately define How far does greatness go.